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China and India: strategic rivals

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KINGSTON - Our daily news is dominated by the stories of the hour. In the realm of international affairs there are many such stories deserving of close attention: fighting in Syria and Iraq, weapons tests in North Korea, relations between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, migration flows and deaths in the Mediterranean region, Brexit and the rise of populism in Europe etc.

 

These all merit the coverage they get, but the process of focusing on the immediate tends to overlook longer-term issues of real significance. Among the narratives which have fallen under the radar screen of late is that of the evolving relationship between China and India, the two emerging giants of Asia.

The relationship between modern China and India has been a highly complicated one. From the start the two countries have been ideologically divided, with China opting for one-party communist rule while India chose the path of parliamentary democracy. This has led to an underlying competition between them to try to prove that one system is superior to the other. The two countries came to blows in a short border war in 1962, one in which the Indians suffered a humiliating defeat. China remains to this day in occupation of Indian territory, and more than 50 years of efforts by experts, diplomats and politicians have been unable to find a solution to the issue. India has also never fully accepted China’s occupation of Tibet, and the Chinese for their part deeply resent the hospitality which India has extended to the Dalai Lama whom they regard as a dangerous Tibetan separatist.

These longstanding disputes have not, however, prevented China and India from developing a productive economic relationship over the last 20 years. From very modest beginnings, the bilateral trading relationship now exceeds the $60-billion mark and is expected to continue growing. China is now one of India’s largest trading partners, although India does not yet rank among China’s leading partners. The two countries have also launched a number of joint ventures in fields such as power generation, mining, telecommunications and infrastructure, and more are in the pipeline. These economic developments have led some to conclude that both countries are developing a stake in each other’s prosperity and that this bodes well for a relationship characterized by cooperation rather than conflict.

The growing economic and military power of both countries has, however, created new sources of tension and suspicion in the bilateral relationship. These relate primarily to their strategic interests and intentions in the Indian Ocean region.

For several years now China has been pursuing a strategy known as “the string of pearls.” Its clear purpose is to develop positions of influence in all of the countries surrounding India. Through generous aid projects and penetration by its intelligence agencies China has sought to challenge India’s once-dominant position in Nepal. It has invested heavily in oil and gas pipelines and other infrastructure in Myanmar (Burma), in the hopes of reducing its dependence on the Straits of Malacca for imports of oil from the Middle East. It has deepened its economic relations with Bangladesh and has replaced India as Bangladesh’s principal trading partner. For the better part of a decade China has been courting the government of Sri Lanka both diplomatically and economically and has certainly managed to reduce India’s traditional influence in that country.

What is perhaps most troubling to the Indians is the intensification of China’s long-standing relationship with Pakistan. With the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is slowly developing a dominant position in the Pakistani economy. With an initial investment of $46 billion, China has become a key player in Pakistan’s transportation infrastructure and energy sector. Most notably China has gained operational control of the deep water port of Gwadar, which is strategically located close to the Straits of Hormuz, the world’s most important route for oil tankers. Indians can only shudder at the thought that the China-Pakistan relationship is now being described as “higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey.”

China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives in the region have been complemented by the deployment of naval ships to the Indian Ocean. Since 2009 China has participated in anti-piracy operations off the coasts of east Africa and has concluded an agreement with Djibouti to provide on-shore facilities for its ships. Its submarines have mounted repeated patrols in the Indian Ocean and have made port visits to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Chinese navy has availed itself of supply, repair and maintenance facilities at the Pakistani port of Karachi. It seems to be only a matter of time before China seeks to establish a permanent naval base in one or more of the “String of Pearls” countries. Pakistan has already indicated that it would welcome the establishment of such a base, as a way of counteracting India’s growing naval power.

India’s response to these Chinese incursions has been mixed. It has deliberately sought to strengthen its relations with some of the smaller inland republics in the Indian Ocean such as the Maldives, the Seychelles and Mauritius. Through active diplomacy it has sought to re-establish its position of influence in Sri Lanka and Nepal, and has been at least partially successful in doing so. It has reinforced its military presence on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Most importantly of all, India has developed even closer military relations with Vietnam, Japan and the United States. It is this last element in Indian policy which is of greatest concern to the Chinese. They see the alignment with the United States as being part and parcel of an American effort to “contain” the rise and spread of Chinese power, much as the Americans sought to “contain” the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In this sense, India has become not merely a regional rival for China, but also part of a strategic threat.

There is little doubt that China and India will continue to pursue their rivalry in the Indian Ocean region. For the time being China has the upper hand both economically and militarily, and can be expected to go on consolidating its position. Its progress, however, will not be problem-free. Thus the political and security instability prevailing in its principal regional ally, Pakistan, is providing the Chinese with almost daily headaches. India for its part is playing catch-up ball in this competition and cannot hope to match the vast sums of money being deployed by China in the region. That will not necessarily be the case in the longer term. The Indian economy is growing at a rapid pace and its naval strength is increasing steadily. The two rivals are likely to become more evenly matched over time.

The evolving relationship between China and India deserves to be closely monitored, not least because both have powerful friends in the form of Russia and the United States. And the rising tide of nationalism in both countries will only serve to accentuate their differences.

Louis A. Delvoie is a Fellow in the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University. `

 

 

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